Hume Notesheet 1

Hume Note Sheet 1

'The rules of morality ... are not conclusions of our reason' - David Hume

Treatise of Human Nature, Book III Part I Section I

The question:What is morality all about?

Hume, pace Kant, rejects the idea that it is our reason which dictates moral judgments.

The moral philosophers Hume was actually thinking about he characterises as follows:

"Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; that the immutable measure of right and wrong impose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself..." A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part I Section 1, Everyman, p.166.

Hume argues against this that reason cannot itself rule out any action - or any action in. On its own it doesn't give us any guidance at all.

Hume's conception of reason

Hume suggests it is a sort of mental operator. It does two things.

It can test for 'agreement' and 'disagreement' amongst ideas.

And it can test for agreement and disagreement between an idea and a state of affairs. (An idea in this case being not a concept but a proposition. )

So, in more detail, the two things reason can do are:

1. Spotting identities ('agreements') between ideas.

For example, 'Brothers are male'. This proposition is a way of saying 'male siblings are male', Hume thinks and what reason does is to tell us that 'male' occurs twice here - once on each side of the 'equation', as it were. Reason is spotting that there are two instances of the one idea, maleness. It is this sameness that makes the proposition as a whole true.

2. Spotting agreements between ideas and the facts they purport to be 'copies' of.

Eg whether there is agreement between the idea the cat is on the mat and the fact of the matter (as revealed ultimately through sense experience) - the cat's being or not being on the mat.

We are talking about the second way in which Hume supposes reason works - its mode of working when it takes into account 'those relations of objects of which experience only gives us information.' Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III Section 3 Everyman p.125.

Reason's role here is to work out, basing itself on our previous experience and knowledge, what causes what. Reason is telling us there is a relation of agreement between my idea - the proposition that eating truffles is likely to result in discomfort - and a fact, the fact that truffles do indeed cause discomfort.

Hume's theory of reasoning and moral judgements

Does Hume's view of reasoning rule out the theory that reason produces moral judgements?

Yes it does, he says. Reason cannot generate moral judgments on its own because it is incapable of guiding action; and moral judgements are nothing if they are not guides to action.

So two points to argue for.

1. The thesis that we think of moral judgments as likely to influence behaviour.

Maybe this is just obvious?

2. The thesis that reason doesn't on its own influence action.

Most of Hume's argumentation on this is to be found in the Treatise, Book II Part III Section 3. Hume repeats just one of those arguments:

Reason deals with truths and falsehoods. These consist in agreement or disagreement either between a fact and an idea that purports to represent it, or between one idea and another. A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part I Section 1, Everyman, p.167.

Eg the cat is on the mat, brothers are male. In the first example 'the cat is on the mat' is true says that there is agreement between 'the cat is on the mat' and an independent fact, the cat's being on the mat.

In the second example, 'bachelors are unmarried' is true says that there is agreement between 'bachelors are unmarried' and a relation between the ideas of bachelor and unmarried.

Whatever can't be part of any such agreement or disagreement is incapable of being true or false.

They can therefore not be an object of reason.

But 'passions, volitions, and actions,' are not capable of being party to such agreements or disagreements.

This is because, he thinks, these are 'independent'. If I have a passion, whatever it is, it doesn't 'agree' or 'disagree' with any other passion or any other thing. It is an 'independent existence'. A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part I Section 1, Everyman, p.167.

Another way of putting this: A 'passion' has no 'representative quality' (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III Section 3Everyman p.127)

Hume's point is that anger (for example) is not like the perception of a physical object like a mountain, say, which on his account involves a relationship between the object and a mental entity. The perception (Hume's terminology) that is the anger (the feeling) is no kind of copy of an independent entity. It is 'an original existence' (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III Section 3Everyman p.127).

You therefore can't have any basis for saying that anger is contrary to reason (or 'contradictory') since a contradiction has to involve two things, one a purported copy of the other. 'It is impossible... that this passion be opposed by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects which they represent.' (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III Section 3 Everyman p.127)

So the argument is:

1. Moral judgments, if anything does, influence behaviour.

2. Reason doesn't on its own influence action.

Subargument:

2.1 Passions are not copies of anything.

2.2 Reason always has to have two things to compare - either idea with object or idea with idea

2.3 Therefore reason cannot evaluate passions

3. Therefore, reason can't on it's own generate moral judgments.

.