Comment on Kant's Ethics

Analyse and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Kant’s deontology as a definitive ethical theory

Daniel Tyler
South Wirral High School

In the two hundred years since its author's death, Kant’s deontology has been the subject of much debate, modification and bemusement. Combining strident absolutism with a much overlooked radical streak, his theory made humans or at least their rational faculty- the ethical lawmaker. For Kant, what was rational was moral, what was irrational was immoral - and seeing as we are all rational beings, we would, when deploying our practical reason, all agree about right and wrong. As such reason accesses the moral law- which Kant formulated as a categorical imperative. There were two main formulations- firstly “to act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will as a universal law”. In other words, when I consider action x in situation y, I must be sure that I would want my fellow rational beings to do action x in situation y. If not, then action x is irrational and I should not undertake it. I find out by checking for contradictions in the law of nature and contradictions in the will. Kant gave examples for both. The second formulation demands we treat people “never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.” Otherwise put, we all possess dignity by virtue of our common rationality. This entails that one should never exploit or manipulate someone as a means to our idea of what the general good is (or to any other end). The moral law described above is binding on all men at all times, and should be followed, not out of inclination, self-interest or blind obedience, but simply because it is rational. The man who does this, is the dutiful man of good will. It is readily apparent that Kant discards consequences as a criterion of an action’s moral goodness.

In short, that is Kant’s deontology. It formed a small part of what he envisaged as his “Copernican Revolution”- a philosophical third way between rationalism and empiricism. Hardly a man of modest aims then, Kant clearly intended his ethical theory to be definitive- that is the most authoritative of its kind. Given this, one must ask what it’s strengths and weaknesses are and what implications they have for the proposition that the theory is definitive. On close inspection, Kant’s deontology possesses weaknesses. It presupposes the primacy of reason in mankind and rejects other virtues that one might also associate with pursuing a moral life. Most gravely, it is highly inflexible, failing to account for the difficult decisions that must ultimately involve means and ends. Nevertheless, an ethical theory can be definitive without having to be perfect since to be definitive is to be the most authoritative of its kind. The Categorical Imperative’s strengths are highly convincing- it is arguable that no other theory possesses such respect for human dignity. This is surely a prerequisite of a “definitive” theory, since ethics is about men and women and their conduct. Moreover, assuming that a definitive ethical theory would need to have as universal a resonance as possible, Kant’s fares well. Reason binds man to man. As such it transcends the customs that divide us to create a global ethic. Provided we find this agreeable, it is major strength. Finally, it fares very well in comparison with other ethical theories- in its depth, rigour and scope. Therefore, whilst not being without faults, the strengths are such that it must be considered the definitive ethical theory.

Nonetheless, let us consider the criticisms commonly offered, dealing first with the theory’s roots, which are in this idea of reason. Reason is essential to Kant’s deontology. It is the means by which we know right from wrong- what is rational is moral, what is irrational is immoral; it gives us our dignity, justifying the second formulation and it provides the test which decides what moral laws we should unconditionally obey . This is so because if reason is universal, the moral commands it generates will be universal and applicable to all men.

Is Kant correct in offering such a view of human nature? One of the weaknesses of his deontology concerns Kant’s assumption that humans are rational beings. David Hume had previously proposed a very different view of human nature. He suggested that desires are primary and that reason cannot guide moral action- rather it is a servant of the passions. Victor Reppert (Ph.D University of Illinois) summed up Hume’s argument as follows- Moral judgments guide action and conduct. Reason cannot guide action and conduct. It is used to discover truth and falsehood, not to guide action. Therefore, moral judgments are not grounded in reason. Our sense of right and wrong is rather found in our breast, so feelings are the source of morality. Kierkgaard agreed, arguing “decency.... has its seat in feeling and in the impulse and consistency of an inner enthusiasm. ‘On principle’ one can do anything.”

If we accept Hume’s view, is a theory laying such emphasis on man’s rational faculty possible, let alone definitive? Let us remember that Kant himself thought ought must imply can. If we cannot use reason to act in a moral situation, then surely reason shouldn’t be the base of our moral decision-making? There is no compatibility-without reason I cannot hope to universalise my actions in a dilemma, since only reason enables me to think objectively and apart from my own circumstances. Therefore, morality should be about showing sympathy towards others.

This is a strong criticism. Kant’s test to decide which moral laws we should follow are all connected with reason. The actions, that when universalised, produce a contradiction are irrational and therefore immoral. What Humeans claim, however, is that really there is no such contradiction on closer inspection. ’Tis not contrary to reason,” said Hume, “to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.” We will address this issue a little later, when we turn to the principle of universalisability.

But does is it make Kant’s deontology any less definitive? Even if as Hume says, humans are emotional beings it doesn’t mean that it should be at the heart of our decision-making. A recognition of emotions does not necessarily justify us in using them in morality. As Kant says inclinations are not enough for an action to be regarded. Moreover, even teleological moral philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham would recognise a role for reason in moral decision-making. He would not have designed the hedonic calculus if he did not think that humans capable of using their rational faculty to the benefit of others rather than oneself.

If reason is important though, must it have complete sovereignty over human affairs? Many think not and their arguments are collectively known as the Aristotelian dilemma. Kant puts undue emphasis on reason in relation to other virtues, with reference to morals. This has created an unbalanced ethical system. For Aristotle and Alasdair Macintyre, the summum bonum is happiness- we only reach it by cultivating a number of virtues, selflessness, benevolence, humility etc. This criticism is more reasonable than the Humean approach because it recognises a role for reason, whilst arguing it should not dominate. More to the point, there is something a little cold about condemning a given action entirely because it is irrational, and not because it hurts another’s feelings. A definitive ethical theory

The third problem with Kant’s emphasis on reason is probably the most serious. Man’s possession of reason endows him with his dignity and enables him to access the moral law. What therefore, becomes of the man who does not possess reason? Are we saying that those who possess more reason are intrinsically better than those with less? Are there therefore gradations of capability to follow his deontology? If the answer is yes then not everyone could live by it fully, reducing the extent to which it is definitive. The other scenario is equally as problematic. If reason is a threshold quality, then we exclude animals from protection. In an era where , for good or evil, we value animal rights almost as much as human ones, doesn’t Kant’s deontology need modification in order to be definitive? This is a fair point, but when we use animals as a means, it is often to treat humans as an end, for example, in animal testing for important medicines. And are we to value all animals the same? Until these questions are answered, Kant’s theory remains largely unaffected.

Let us now turn to the categorical imperative’s operation. It is clear that that there are weaknesses. Kant argues that moral people conduct their lives solely in accordance with the rules generated by this categorical imperative. Yet some of the rules the imperative could feasibly generate are at best morally insignificant. Michael Palmer considered the example of a bibliophile who wills that whenever a man buys a new book he should write his name inside. There is nothing self-contradictory about this rule, nor would it produce an unacceptable situation to us, and yet it is morally insignificant. So the categorical imperative as much arrives at rules which are irrelevant, as it arrives at important ones. The ability of a rule to be universalised does not solely guarantee its moral worth. Therefore is it a sufficient criterion of moral value?

Kant’s deontology is arguably no less definitive for it, though. Not only is the criticism mere philosophical sophistry, it can also be countered. All that example shows is that it may be acceptable to write one’s name inside the book, because one could just as easily will the opposite without contradiction. It is when we cannot will opposites that actions are prohibited. For example, when we universalise lying (i.e. the opposite of telling the truth) , we do generate a contradiction. If we all lied to achieve an end, then truth telling would quickly become meaningless., and so lying would become so too. Therefore, for the important moral dilemmas, Kant’s deontology does provide definite answers, which is why this criticism does not reduce the extent to which it is definitive.

The second problem associated with universalisability is more profound. In fact, if I were to contend that Kant’s deontology was not definitive, then I would unhesitatingly choose this weakness to support my case. If we remember, Kant proposed two contradictions- one in the law of nature, the other in the will, that would make an action immoral. The first is agreeable enough, the second is more problematic. Kant thinks we can reject those rules that when universalised produce a state of affairs which we would all, as rational beings find unacceptable. This assumes too much. Even if all humans are rational, it is obvious that temperaments and desires vary from person to person. What one agent finds intolerable, the next finds acceptable. Two examples illustrate this point, those of the sadist and the grocer. A sadist may easily wish for sadism to be universalised. Yes, there entails the risk that he may be a victim but is that situation wholly unacceptable, when there lies the correlative possibility that he may be the practitioner too? The first formulation provides no reason for a man of that type to not engage in sadism. Nevertheless, in Kant’s defence, the second formulation- to not treat others as a means to an end, does. By torturing another, the sadist, would be using them as a means to his pleasure.

The second example- not helping the helpless- cannot be skirted so neatly. A rational being may not like this rule to apply to themselves but that isn’t saying they’d find it inconsistent. It depends on the persons’ temperament. Let us suppose I am a Manchester Liberal with no time for those unable take responsibility for their welfare. I could easily universalize the maxim to not help the helpless. I may not like to be neglected should I become destitute but I could accept it inasmuch as I accept capitalism cuts both ways. There is nothing irrational this. I could only be accused of being irrational if I actively desired my interests to be neglected. But there is nothing irrational about someone like me accepting it.

This criticism cannot easily be countered. For many people, there clearly is something wrong with selfishness but as Pojman writes “it’s dubious whether Kant’s Categorical Imperative captures what is wrong with egoism” . Not even the second formulation does. I am not directly using a person as a means to an end by not helping them. Therefore, , we might have to concede that Kant’s deontology is inadequate in that respect. Perhaps a more emotive ethic might work, where selfishness is concerned. In Kant’s defence, his deontology is superior in condemning selfish inclinations behind supposedly moral actions- the means never justify apparently good ends. Therefore, it is still possible to hold his theory is definitive whilst accepting inevitable imperfections.

Some imperfections have even been rectified. Before WD Ross, there was the profound problem of conflicting duties. If it is always right to a) tell the truth and b) preserve life, what should I tell a Nazi soldier when he asks me the whereabouts of a Jewish refugee secretly hiding in my house? Here my duties conflict. Doing a entails I neglect b and vice versa. Kant’s view that I should hide the man but then tell the soldier his whereabouts grossly inadequate. Yes, I have done my duty on both counts, but am I not acting like Pilate, callously washing my hands of a fellow human sufferer? Fortunately, this dilemma has been resolved in a fashion that both compliments and refines his theory. WD Ross suggested that Kant’s Man of Good Will would use his rational faculty to establish a hierarchy of duties. For him, the duty to preserve life would override his duty to tell the truth. All rational people would probably agree with this. This solution allows a modification of Kant’s deontology, while remaining faithful to its key tenets. The moral agent continues to act freely and responsibly but perhaps with more sensitivity. There is therefore no reason to deny his theory is definitive on the grounds of conflicting duties.

The remaining criticisms are also inadequate. Kant’s categorical imperative is to be followed at all times without exception, and while consistency is guaranteed, there may be times when making exceptions is not merely morally permissible but morally necessary. For example, I may rationally conclude that taking up arms is wrong but wouldn’t the invasion of my country by an illiberal military regime demand I make an exception? A relativist approach seems desirable. Kant’s “formal” ethic ignores the importance of “the situation”, the complexities of which exert great demands on moral agents. Why should I be concerned with universalising my actions when I should focus my attention on the situation in order to make the most sensitive decision?

Moreover, there are times when humans may have to be treated as means to ends. Theoretically, it is admirable that Kant prohibits this, but “if taken seriously, it would make it impossible to reach a decision where two people’s interests conflict. The difficulties are particularly obvious in political philosophy, which requires some principle, such as preference for the majority, by which the interests of some can, where necessary, be sacrificed for others.” The smoking ban might be an example of this.

These relativist criticisms are valid to a degree. It seems ethically tunnel-visioned to not let the demands of the situation guide moral choices. It is doubtful, however that this reduces the extent to which it is definitive. Kant’s deontology is certainly morally demanding but he recognised this. That is why he posited immortality and a deity so humans may achieve their perfection in the feature. There is little chance of compromise on this issue but which is the more definitive ethical theory – one where no exceptions can be made or one which is so riddled with them that no action can really be condemned? This is why specific rule utilitarianism, for all its strengths remains les definitive than Kant’s Moral Law.

Russell’s criticism is a little harder to answer because Kant was no fan of democracy. Russell proposes a resolution himself, which one may find satisfactory. He suggests counting all men equally in determining actions by which many are affected. Whether or not this is sufficiently Kantian is debatable but it may give the theory more practical worth.

Relativists may also point to Kant’s ignorance of consequences as a serious weakness. An ethical system detached from teleology is surely detached from reality. A football manager or a politician may be frequently heard to ask “judge me on my results”. Why should morality be any different? Especially as motives are hard to evaluate. Imagine two journeys that reach the same point at the same time. One was a straight ride, with absolute concentration on the drivers part the other was a little rockier with a few stops at a service station and some arguing along the way. Ultimately however, they shared a commonality- they both got to the same point at the same time. Isn’t that the most important thing with our actions?

This is a valid point. It does seem curious to not consider the product of an action when evaluating it. I may act out of goodwill but if I do so a little lethargically and don’t produce good I should be judged accordingly? Nevertheless, consequences are very difficult for moral agents to see. That is why Bentham’s Act Utilitarianism can never be a definitive ethical theory. Moreover, by accepting consequentialism, we accept that ends can be justified by means, which entails the sorts of problem that make utilitarianism so unattractive. We might therefore tolerate Kant’s deontology for a greater good- provided you forgive my own consequentialism there!

So, the weaknesses of Kant’s deontology have been established. Some are stronger than others. The issue of universalising irrelevant commands is trivial and the consequentialist criticisms are necessary to accept in order to appreciate the correlative benefits. Nevertheless, Kant is unwise to assume that, by virtue of our rational faculty, all humans find the same situations intolerable. Practically, this make his test less able to function. Moreover, his reasoning fails to capture what exactly is wrong with egoism. On the whole, however, his theory remains definitive, more so now after Ross’ modifications.

The fact remains that Kant’s deontology also possesses overwhelming strengths, especially in relation to other ethical theories. It corrects the Utilitarian proposition that the morality of an action is based upon an end, which is the number of those benefiting from action x. If action x is the violent sacrifice of a minority’s rights to suit the majority, then it cannot be condemned under act utilitarianism. The Categorical Imperative, however, does not justify any action in terms of majority benefit but solely on its inherent rightness and wrongness- by whether or not it conforms to the formulations of the moral law. Brute numbers cannot make an action right. The first formulation imposes duties on all equally and impartially because it is universal. The second formulation demands no one be treated as a means to an end. Thus even if in action pleases the majority at the minority’s expense, if it is against duty, it is prohibited, no matter how much the majority protest. Justice is no longer the interest of the stronger but is impartial instead. Surely this is the mark of a definitive ethical theory?

So Kant gives protection to those on the periphery of society. Granted, it runs contrary to political expediency, but at least it guarantees that minorities are sensitively considered, even if ultimately, the majority must be favoured. On the other hand, the strength has implications. For example, the political left’s foolhardy obsession with placating minorities is based on the same rationale as Kantian moral philosophy. Nevertheless, in extreme cases, such as Hitler’s pogroms, Kant’s deontology is an important and relevant piece of scholarship. It also demands we look at decisions sensitively and not in pure terms of quantitative data. As such, even if we don’t always achieve it in this life, it is a supreme standard of morality to aspire to, which is why it is a definitive ethical theory.

The protection of minorities stems from the protection of all humans. According to Bowie, “Kant’s theory gives humans intrinsic worth as the rational point of creation. Humans can only ever be treated as ends in themselves.” Instead, we are all accorded respect regardless of how much we earn or what social class we belong to. It is a truly classless ethical theory. Utilitarianism may also talk of equity but Kant’s theory enshrines it. Palmer cites an example from Kant’s own life to support this view. During his final illness, he received a visit from his doctor. Though very ill, he managed to get up, not sitting down until his visitor had. “The feeling for humanity has not yet left me”, he said. His manners expressed respect for a fellow rational being. So does his ethical theory.

The respect is felt in more ways than one. For a deontological theory, Kant’s deontology is actually very agent-centred. Kant made clear that blind obedience to rules is not enough and was optimistic about the faculty of practical reason to resolve problems. This is presumably why the imperative itself possesses no content and recommends no specific maxim. As Grosch and Large put it, “we as the rational and free agents must construct the various maxims which are to guide our moral lives. It is up to us to provide our own moral content. As long as we are prepared to submit each of our maxims to the test of the moral law, discard them if they appear not to conform to it and affirm it if they do, then, for Kant, it is up to us how we live our lives.” Like Rousseau, Kant thought humans realised their freedom as a lawmaker. Therefore his theory is deontological without the overtly legalist hue. Now of course, granting humans freedom to prescribe their own laws can be dangerous. The blundering chaos of Situation Ethics is testament to that. Kant’s deontology is different in important ways, however. The formulations of the moral law are clear and Kant’s tests structure our moral decision-making. One immediately sees the difference between this and Fletcher’s woolly instruction to “do what love requires” in each situation. Both theories commit us to the creek of ethical decision-making because they presuppose our moral maturity. Kant gave us a paddle in the shape of logical tests, Fletcher did not. For balancing freedom and legalism therefore, Kant’s deontology is definitive.

As a consequence of this balance, Kant’s deontology provides a powerful set of moral principles. There is little doubt that the Categorical Imperative, through one or both formulations, prohibits theft, murder, fraud, violence and sexual abuse. For example no one could rationally will murder as a universal law. It causes contradictions in the law of nature and the will and disobeys the second formulation to not treat rational beings as a means to an end. That egoism is not convincingly condemned must be accepted but for an ethical theory to be definitive, it must be able to condemn the basic wrongs, and Kant’s deontology does this impeccably. This is because these acts are prohibited without qualification or exception, which is a key strength of any deontological ethical theory. With exceptions comes dilution. Kant’s position on murder etc. is clear and unconditional. The clarity makes the theory definitive.

So too, does Kant’s emphasis on the good will. This is often lost among the formulations of the Categorical imperative and human rationality underpinning it. Kant argues that the man of good will follows the Moral Law because he knows it is right, not because he may realise some good out of it, or because he is naturally inclined to do so. We may be inclined to do what benefits ourselves individually but morality ought to be about more than personal preference. After all, if inclination guides us, we will only perform what happens to be a moral action, while it suits us. When it no longer does, we will not. If we perform an action for duty’s sake however we will continue to do so, even if inclinations change. Kant’s theory is definitive, inasmuch as it commits the agent to moral consistency. Granted, it might be said that motives are difficult to evaluate- a study of History would tell us that. Does that excuse the removal of intent from moral matters, however?

A definitive ethical theory would surely have to be capable of universal appeal. The Categorical Imperative does possess this potentiality. One doesn’t have to be a theist to follow it since morality derives from the rational faculty. On the other hand, it is about as compatible as it can be with Christianity without losing secular appeal. As Mrs Hesketh wrote, Kant’s recognition of the importance of motive fully endorses the Christian approach to ethical decision making . With regards to the denominations, the emphasis on reason appeals to Catholic tradition and the primacy of motive over end reflects Kant’s Pietist heritage. For sure, this is only a strength provided we actually desire a universal ethical system. A cultural relativist might say that what is right is and should be subject to the society in which one lives. Cultural relativists may be confusing custom with morality so surely a theory which transcends differences is the best and most definitive? Isn’t it what the world requires?

Provided we accept our common rational faculty, a universal ethical theory does seem possible. Indeed, Kant’s late treatise on “Perpetual Peace” proposed a confederation of states bound by a covenant forbidding war. Reason condemned war, he thought and since we all are endowed with it, a confederation could work. Two hundred years on, Kant’s vision has been realised (albeit imperfectly) in the shape of the United Nations, which presupposes all humans find the same acts abhorrent and the same rights acceptable. More to the point, the Declaration of Human Rights fits neatly with the second formulation- to treat all human beings equally and as ends in themselves. This is not for any utilitarian purpose- rather it is because it is right in itself. The relevance of Kant’s theory is undeniable, which in turn makes it definitive today. One is only left wonder how Situation Ethics will be seen in 200 years time!

In conclusion, Kant’s deontology is without question, the definitive ethical theory. Justice is associated with objective rightness and wrongness, not sheer arithmetic. This prevents heinous acts from being committed for the majority’s pleasure, which Bentham seems happy to allow. Kant’s insistence that humans (qua reason) possess innate dignity must also be applauded for its equity and agent-centeredness. Meanwhile, his theory enshrines the importance of intent. No consequentialist system does this- not even rule utilitarianism. More than that, Kant’s deontology prohibits the worst acts and encourage the best ones. Grosch and Large contend that “every time we universalise a maxim (such as always tell the truth), we find that it works.” Of course, there are failings but it towers over the ethical theories that others have purported- from utilitarianism, with its arithmetic- for morality to Situation Ethics with its well-meaning absurdity.

The strongest reason for claiming Kant’s deontology is definitive lies in its relevance. It has stood the test of time, from the Enlightenment to the present. It has done so because of its unconditional respect for human rights. It will continue to do so for many centuries to come.

Daniel Tyler
South Wirral High School

January 2008